Semanticists often assume an ontology for natural language that includes not only ordinary objects, but also events, as well as other entities. We link this ontology to how speakers represent static and dynamic entities. Specifically, we test how speakers determine whether an entity counts as "atomic" by using count vs. mass (e.g., some gleebs, some gleeb) and distributive vs. non-distributive descriptions (e.g., gleeb every second or so, gleeb around a little). We then seek evidence for atomic representation in a non-linguistic task. Ultimately we suggest that natural language ontology reveals properties of language-independent conceptualization.

Wellwood, A., S. J. Hespos, and L. Rips. (2018). How similar are objects and events? Acta Linguistica.

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Beginning at least with Bach (1986), semanticists have suggested that the objects/events and substances/processes that nouns and verbs apply to are strongly parallel. We investigate whether these parallels can be understood to reflect a shared representational format in cognition, which in turn underlies aspects of the intuitive metaphysics of these categories. We hypothesized that a way of counting (atomicity) is necessary for object and event representations, unlike substance or process representations. Atomicity is strongly implied by plural language (some gorps, for novel gorp) but not mass language (some gorp). We investigate the language-perception interface across these domains using minimally different images and animations designed to encourage atomicity ('natural' spatial and temporal breaks), versus those that should not ('unnatural' breaks). Testing preference for matching such stimuli with mass or count syntax, our results support Bach’s analogy in perception, and highlight the formal role of atomicity in object and event representation.

Wellwood, A., S. J. Hespos, and L. Rips. (2018). The object : substance :: event : process analogy. In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2, Oxford University Press.

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Kotek et al. (2015) argue on the basis of novel experimental evidence that sentences like 'Most of the dots are blue' are ambiguous, i.e. have two distinct truth conditions. Kotek at al furthermore suggest that when their results are taken together with those of earlier work by Lidz et al. (2011), the overall picture that emerges casts doubt on the conclusions that Lidz et al. drew from their earlier results. We disagree with this characterization of the relationship between the two studies. Our main aim in this reply is to clarify the relationship as we see it. In our view, Kotek et al.'s central claims are simply logically independent of those of Lidz et al.: the former concern which truth condition(s) a certain kind of sentence has, while the latter concern the procedures that speakers choose for the purposes of determining whether a particular truth condition is satisfied in various scenes. The appearance of a conflict between the two studies stems from inattention to the distinction between questions about truth conditions and questions about verification procedures.

Hunter, T., J. Lidz, D. Odic, and A. Wellwood. (2017). On how verification tasks are related to verification procedures: a reply to Kotek et al. Natural Language Semantics, 25(2).

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Acquiring the correct meanings of words expressing quantities (seven, most) and qualities (red, spotty) present a challenge to learners. Understanding how children succeed at this requires understanding not only what kinds of data are available to them, but also the biases and expectations they bring to the learning task. The results of our word-learning task with 4 year-olds indicates that a "syntactic bootstrapping" hypothesis correctly predicts a bias towards quantity-based interpretations when a novel word appears in the syntactic position of a determiner, but leaves open the explanation of a bias towards quality-based interpretations when the same word is presented in the syntactic position of an adjective. We develop four computational models that differentially encode how lexical, conceptual, and perceptual factors could generate the latter bias. Simulation results suggest it results from a combination of lexical bias and perceptual encoding.

Wellwood, A., A. Gagliardi, and J. Lidz. (2016). Syntactic and lexical inference in the acquisition of novel superlatives. Language Learning and Development.

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Acquiring the correct meanings of number words (e.g., seven, forty-two) is challenging, as such words fail to describe salient properties of individuals or objects in their environment, referring rather to properties of sets of such objects or individuals. Previous research has revealed a critical role for language itself in how children acquire number word meanings, however attempts to pinpoint precisely the strong linguistic cues has proved challenging. We propose a novel "syntactic bootstrapping" hypothesis in which categorizing a novel word as a determiner leads to quantity-based interpretations. The results of a word learning task with 4 year olds indicates that this hypothesis is on the right track.

Wellwood, A., D. Odic, J. Halberda, and J. Lidz. (2012). Choosing quantity over quality: syntax guides interpretive preferences for novel superlatives. Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society annual meeting.

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No language has a determiner meaning something like 'less than half' (e.g., a fost to complement determiner most), nor does any language have a determiner meaning something like what most means, but which is non-conservative (e.g., a grfost). Like the hypothetical fost, but unlike the hypothetical grfost, every natural language determiner is "conservative"—i.e., it lives on the set denoted by its complement NP. Are these two typological gaps equally principled? We look at this question from the perspective of language acquisition, asking whether the two meanings (non-conservative or conservative 'less than half') are equally acquirable. Our experiments suggest that children are able to access the non-existent, yet conservative determiner meaning fost, but not a non-conservative counterpart like grfost.

Hunter, T., J. Lidz, A. Wellwood, and A. Conroy. (2012). Restrictions on the meanings of determiners: typological generalisations and learnability. Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 19.

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